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I. INTRODUCTION
The Caspian Sea is an oil-rich natural resource bordering five countries.
Surrounded by Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran, the
Caspian is considered by many to be the boundary between Europe and
Asia.1 As a result of its geographic location, the Caspian Sea and its
resources have been at the center of many regional disputes.2 Following the
breakup of the Soviet Union, "the legal status of the [Caspian] [S]ea has
emerged as one of the most contentious international problems facing the
region." 3 Problems arose because all five littoral, or bordering, states wanted
access to the Sea's natural resources, but only some states agreed that,
regardless of the technical borders, all states should still share the resources. 4
Currently, the five states are engaged in negotiations to determine the best
way to divide the Caspian Sea and its resources among themselves. Because
the Caspian Sea contains what may be the third-largest oil and gas reserves in
the world, it is understandable that each state wants to increase its share of
the available resources.
This Note will examine the current dispute concerning the delimitation of
the Caspian Sea, discuss how negotiation is being utilized to avoid serious
armed conflict, and suggest that third-party intervention is necessary to
ISee Alexander Rahr, Caspian Oil, INTERNATIONALE POLITIK-TRANSATLANTIC
EDITION, Summer 2001, at 80.
2 Caspian Sea Region, Energy Information Administration, at http://www.eia.doe.
gov/emeu/cabs/caspian.html (July 2002) (discussing how several conflicts have arisen
over mutual claims to the Sea and that the unresolved status of the Caspian has hindered
development of oil and gas resources and potential export pipelines). See also Natalia
Borisova, U.S. Members of Caspian Consortium Get News of Unwelcome Guest-Iran,
OIL DAILY (Washington, D.C.), Nov. 15, 1994, at 1; Michael P. Croissant & Cynthia M.
Croissant, The Caspian Sea Status Dispute: Azerbayjani Perspectives, 3 Caucasian
Regional Studies (1998), at http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/crs/eng/0301-Ol.htm (last visited
Feb. 8, 2002) (discussing how "cultures and geopolitical orientations are clashing [in the
Caspian Region]").
3 Kamyar Mehdiyoun, Current Development, Ownership of Oil and Gas Resources
in the Caspian Sea, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 179, 179 (2000).
4 Caspian Border Dispute Is Latest Woe, PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS (New York), July
21, 1993, at 3 (stating that Kazakhstan leadership maintains that all states should continue
to have access to natural resources).
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resolve the dispute because ten years of negotiations have produced few
results. Part II details the history of the Caspian Sea Region and provides the
reader with a framework for analyzing the ongoing dispute. In international
disputes, it is often necessary to acknowledge the historical context in order
to understand the present dynamics. In this case, the breakup of the Soviet
Union has affected the Caspian Region by creating successor states to treaties
that initially were between two states, and has increased tensions in the area
as the newly created states have struggled to maintain separate identities
from that of Russia. Part III of this Note examines how international law has
shaped the negotiations among the littoral states and then focuses on how the
Caspian negotiations have changed in the past decade and examines each
littoral state's evolving position on the demarcation of the Caspian.
Part IV then discuses how border disputes involving shared waters have
been resolved elsewhere, providing comparisons and identifying useful
frameworks for resolving the type of border dispute plaguing the Caspian.
Part V then examines international methods of dispute resolution 5 in an effort
5 This Note focuses more on traditional "American" alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) processes, such as third-party assisted negotiation [mediation/conciliation],
independent expert investigation [inquiry], appraisal and evaluation, and combinations or
adaptations of methods that create a range of innovative methods to resolve disputes that
are also used in international settings. See U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1, for a complete
listing of peaceful methods of dispute resolution. See also Christine Chinkin, Alternative
Dispute Resolution Under International Law, in REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
INSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA 123 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 1998). This Note will only
specifically discuss negotiation, mediation, and conciliation, despite the potential
applicability of other international dispute resolution mechanisms. It is important,
however, to note that coercion and voluntary relinquishment are also mechanisms to
resolve disputes. Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of International Dispute Settlement, 1
EMORY J. INT'L DiSP. RES. 1, 20-21 (1986) (suggesting that these mechanisms, although
occasionally utilized, are not advocated by Mr. Bilder and are usually the source of last
resort for the countries involved). In fact, coercive procedures were utilized in the
Caspian when only Imperial Russia and Persia shared the resources of the Sea. See Eric
W. Sievers, The Caspian, Regional Seas, and the Case for a Cultural Study of Law, 13
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 361, 368 (2001) (discussing how Russia's military power was
repeatedly exerted on Persia). Russia, when seen as a world superpower, was easily able
to violate Persian rights in the Caspian and could get away with such action because
Persia was not as powerful. Iran: Paper Views Problems with Caspian Sea Legal Regime,
WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Aug. 7, 2001, available at 2001 WL 27167115. It is
interesting to note that even Soviet Russia recognized the many concessions previously
made by Persia in the Treaty of Friendship, signed by the parties on February 26, 1921.
See Treaty of Friendship (Feb. 26, 1921), in 1 SOVIET TREATY SERIES, (1917-1928) 92-
93 (Leonard Shapiro ed., 1950). The Treaty stated that (1) the Soviet Government
declared all treaties, agreements, and conventions signed by the Tsarist Government of
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to identify a more effective framework of resolving the status of the Caspian
and suggests alternatives to the state party negotiators who have been
meeting to parcel out the seabed of the Caspian. Part VI discusses the
potential for conflict if.this dispute is not resolved peacefully and details
what is necessary to bring the dispute to resolution. Because the potential for
conflict is great, it is important that the parties continue the use of peaceful
dispute resolution mechanisms to bring about an end to the dispute. An
examination of the effectiveness of negotiations between the states and the
progression of the negotiations, along with comparisons to other similar
border disputes, may display a framework for dealing with other types of
complex border disputes. Negotiations involving all of the parties may appear
on the surface to be the best method for resolving this dispute. However,
because the negotiations have been ineffective for the past decade, this Note
suggests using a neutral third-party mediator or establishing a conciliation
commission to resolve the dispute in the Caspian.
II. HISTORY OF THE CASPIAN REGION
A. The Caspian Sea
For an accurate assessment of the Caspian negotiations to take place, one
must first look to the history of the Caspian Region to understand why the
Sea is so important to the littoral states. The Caspian Sea has played an
important role in trade, serving as a shipping route since the Middle Ages.6
However, it was explorer Marco Polo who noted the abundance of oil in the
Caspian region some 700 years ago. 7 He wrote of "a fountain from which oil
Russia to be null and void; (2) the Soviet Government condemned the Tsarist policies
that resulted in occupation without consent; and (3) Persia would be permitted to have a
navy present on the Caspian. Id. Provision number three was necessary because previous
agreements between the states had granted sole military might of the Caspian to Imperial
Russia. Id.
6 Theodore C. Jonas, "Parting the Sea": Caspian Littoral States Seek Boundary
Disputes'Resolution, OIL & GAS J., May 28, 2001, at 60, available at 2001 WL 9153154.
Even the ancient Greeks knew of the Caspian Sea, calling it Hyrcanium Mare or Caspium
Mare. See ROSANNA KELLY, RussIA 26 (Madge Phillips ed., 1994). In fact, Virgil and
Shakespeare both make mention of the Caspian as if its shores contained wild beasts. Id.
(discussing Virgil's reference to "Tigers of Hyrcania," and Shakespeare's mention of
"The rugged Pyrrhus like th' Hyrcanian beast" in Hamlet). These fanciful images are no
longer accurate, as the Caspian has been transformed into a "busy navigation channel" as
its "waters are exploited for fishing, and its sea-bed for oil extraction." Id.
7 Robert Cullen, The Rise and Fall of the Caspian Sea, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, May
1999, at 11.
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springs in great abundance."8 The Caspian lies between Europe and Asia,
east of the Caucusus Mountains, making it an important boundary between
East and West. The Caspian Sea is the "largest inland body of water in the
world" and is approximately the size of Japan. 9 However, "[diuring the past
several centuries, the Caspian has been shrinking in size because the rivers
that empty into it bring less water than it loses by evaporation."' 0 Despite
this loss of water, the Caspian remains extremely important for the resources
it provides to those who border its waters.
B. Legal Status Afforded by Treaties
Negotiations between the littoral states have been unable to determine
the precise legal status of the Caspian-possibly due to the myriad of treaties
over the years that have also failed to provide a precise designation. Since
Imperial Russia" 1 and Persia12 recognized the importance of the Caspian Sea,
they deemed it necessary to create rules for its use, and the two countries
8 1d. at 15.
9 Faraz Sanei, Note, The Caspian Sea Legal Regime, Pipeline Diplomacy, and the
Prospects for Iran's Isolation from the Oil and Gas Frenzy: Reconciling Tehran's Legal
Options with Its Geopolitical Realities, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 681, 693 (2001). The
Caspian Sea is about 1000 meters deep with a surface area of approximately 400,000
square kilometers. Id.
10 Leszek A. Kosinski, Caspian Sea, in WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA, 274-75
(1997) (discussing how "large irrigation projects built by the Soviet Union in the Caspian
Basin drain off much water from the [ ] rivers").
I" When the Bolsheviks toppled Tsarist Russia during the Russian Revolution of
1917, Imperial Russia made way for the newly established Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (U.S.S.R.), also known as the Soviet Union. See generally MARTIN MALIA,
THE SOVIET TRAGEDY-A HISTORY OF SOCIALISM IN RUSSIA, 1917-1991 110-38 (1994).
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the U.S.S.R. gave way to a Russian
Federation, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); the twelve Soviet Republics
were granted independence, but still maintained loose ties to the CIS and Russia, the
largest republic. Id. at 489. Many of these republics have since broken away and become
totally independent nations, but unless otherwise designated, for the purposes of this Note
when speaking of post-Soviet Russia, they are collectively referred to as "Russia," the
most powerful state in the CIS. Actually, the CIS has become much more dynamic under
President Putin, who is said to have created "an atmosphere of cooperation on an equal
footing beneficial to all parties." Olga Nedbayeva, Azerbayan Urges Russia to Play a
"Decisive Role" in Karabakh Dispute, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Jan. 26, 2002, available at
2002 WL 2325763.
12 Persia has been referred to as the Islamic Republic of Iran since 1935. AMERICAN
HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 717 (3d ed. 1993). This Note refers to either Persia or
Iran depending on whether references are pre- or post- 1935.
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entered into various treaties. 13 Following several wars, Russia and Persia
signed treaties to "fix the land boundaries between them and regulate [the]
use of Caspian waters." 14 The 1723 Treaty of St. Petersburg was one of the
first recorded treaties regarding the Caspian Sea, whereby Russia obtained
rights to use the Caspian. 15 Later treaties between the two countries further
demonstrated the military power that Russia exerted upon Persia, as Russian
rights to the Caspian were repeatedly affirmed and expanded, while Persian
rights were diminished. 16 However, the tide changed following the Russian
Revolution, and on February 26, 1921, the Russian Socialist Federated
Republic and Persia entered into a Treaty of Friendship that actually
provided Persia with some rights to the Caspian Sea. 17 This treaty was the
first effort to correct some of the sweeping concessions that Persia had
granted to the mighty Imperial Russia, and as a result, those previous
concessions were declared void. 18 The 1921 Friendship Treaty was expanded
and further affirmed by a series of treaties, most granting Persia increased
rights for navigation and fishing. One such treaty, implemented in 1940,19
confirmed ten-mile exclusive national zones for each state, which remained
in effect until the collapse of the Soviet Union.20 One comprehensive
boundary treaty, executed in 1954, still exists, but unfortunately for the
13 See infra.
14 Jonas, supra note 6, at 60. Since the treaties all dealt with water use, military
might, or fishing, it is obvious that the Russian and Persian Empires were interested in
the Sea as a trade route and source of food-not for the minerals in the seabed. Id. As a
result, the states have no legal regime to provide guidance in apportioning the rights to
the Sea.
15 Sievers, supra note 5, at 368.
16 Id. For example, the 1813 Gulistan Treaty stipulated that "except for the Russian
State, no other state may have a military flag on the Caspian Sea." Sanei, supra note 9, at
768-69 (showing that "the Turkmenchai Treaty of 1828 reaffirmed the exclusive right of
Russian naval presence in the Caspian").
17 SOVIET TREATY SERIES, supra note 5, at 92-94. See also Barry Hart Dubner, The
Caspian, Is It a Lake, a Sea or an Ocean and Does It Matter? The Danger of Utilizing
Unilateral Approaches to Resolving Regional/International Issues, 18 DICK. J. INT'L L.
253, 260 (2000).
18 Sievers, supra note 5, at 369.
19 "The 1940 Treaty on Trade and Navigation... [is] the most detailed and
comprehensive set of rules regarding legal relations between the two states in the
Caspian." Sanei, supra note 9, at 769.
20 Sievers, supra note 5, at 369.
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parties involved, it only determines the land border-not the sea boundary
across the Caspian. 21
It has been suggested that the U.S.S.R. delimited the Caspian between
the Soviet littoral republics in 1970, but no written documentation verifying
this has ever been produced by legal scholars. 22 However, Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan have produced maps and documents "officially" recognizing the
division of the Caspian among the Soviet republics that the Soviet Union
suggests were made. 23 According to the international agreements of 1921 and
1940, any decisions that affect the Caspian and its resources must be made
jointly by those countries bordering the Sea.24 Despite the breakup of the
U.S.S.R., Russia still endorses many of the treaties that existed between
Soviet Russia and Persia concerning the use of the Caspian, including these
two. 25 Moreover, some in Iran also believe that the treaties should still be in
force and that the former Soviet republics should be entitled to divide among
themselves only that portion of the Sea previously afforded to Soviet
21 Mehdiyoun, supra note 3, at 181. However, even if the sea boundary were
determined by the treaty, it is unlikely that all the Russian Republics would agree to share
only the Soviet portion. See Steven Lee Myers, Editorial, Russia: Carving Up the
Caspian Sea, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2002, at A8 (discussing how Russia has signed
independent agreements with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in recent months-an
indication that Russia will form its own plans, without regard to the former Soviet
divisions).
22 Sievers, supra note 5, at 369. The inability of legal scholars to produce such
documents, is, of course, not determinative; however, it does suggest that no de jure
division ever occurred-even if a de facto division did exist.
23 Sanei, supra note 9, at 779. Of course, these divisions would support the sectoral
division they are promoting, so as to keep the plentiful oil fields within their national
boundaries.
24 Azerbaijan & The Transcaucasus-The Caspian Demarcation Problem, APS
REv. OIL MARKET TRENDS, Nov. 14, 1994, available at 1994 WL 2478345. Because of
the language requiring joint decisions, it may not be possible for Russia to delimit its
portion of the Caspian without Iran's consent. Of course, when the 1921 and 1940
agreements were signed, only two countries bordered the Caspian. Id. Now, due to the
breakup of the Soviet Union, five states are expected to make joint decisions regarding
resources. "Although Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan did not sign the treaties,
the Alma Ata Declaration of December 1991, which established the Commonwealth of
Independent States, included a provision recognizing the validity of all treaties and
agreements signed by the U.S.S.R. and was signed by all of the former Soviet republics."
Croissant & Croissant, supra note 2. Consequently, the states have accepted the fact that
decisions should be made jointly, even though they do not all accept the treaties. See
Azerbaian & The Transcaucasus-The Caspian Demarcation Problem, supra.
25 Azerbaijan & The Transcaucasus-The Caspian Demarcation Problem, supra
note 24.
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Russia.26 Consequently, because none of the previous treaties have created a
substantive basis for delimitation that can be applied today, the littoral states
must determine the best rules for dividing the resources of the Caspian to the
benefit of all.
C. Breakup of the U.S.S.R.
The unresolved division of the Caspian Sea is a problem that has been
festering for over ten years (since the collapse of the Soviet Union), because
the parties have not been able to devise a clear plan for delimitation. 27
Following the breakup of the U.S.S.R. in 1991, Russia, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan became independent. 28 A sea that was once
shared between only two countries, the U.S.S.R. and Iran, suddenly had to be
apportioned among five independent nations-including four newly created
states-with conflicting interests regarding the oil and other resources
contained in the Caspian Sea.
The breakup of the U.S.S.R. has left the region with unstable politics,
ethnic tensions, and faltering economies. 29 It is against this unstable
backdrop that party negotiators must devise a manageable plan to demarcate
the Caspian. Any agreement adopted by the parties must be fair and yet still
26 Interview with Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, General Secretary of the Freedom Movement
of Iran, Former Foreign Minister of Iran, in Columbus, Ohio (Nov. 13, 2001) (slightly
contradicting the Iranian policy that has been advocated at some meetings of the littoral
states, which requires national economic zones, with common ownership of the
remainder of the Caspian; also contradicting the other Iranian proposal of equal division);
Cf Peter Goodspeed, Military Tensions Heightened over Caspian Sea Oil, NATIONAL
POST, Aug. 25, 2001, at A13, available at 2001 WL 27076531 (stating that Russia,
Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan "insist Iran should be satisfied with its old boundaries").
27 Caspian Summit Shelved Again, HART'S EUR. OFFSHORE PETROLEUM NEWSL.,
Sept. 5, 2001, available at 2002 WL 7167435.
28 Mehdiyoun, supra note 3, at 179. The breakup of the Soviet Union is especially
significant because three historic rivals-Russia, Iran, and Turkey-now struggle for
influence across the Caspian Region and beyond. Croissant & Croissant, supra note 2.
While Russia attempts to maintain the influence it has enjoyed over the former Soviet
republics, Turkey strives to become the new force of influence in the area by
emphasizing the common bonds of religion, ethnicity, and language which it shares with
the Muslim republics. Id.
29 See Martha Brill Olcott, Oral Testimony on Caspian Sea Oil Exports, before the
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (July 8, 1998), at http://www.ceip.org/people/
olccaspo.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2002) (referring to the declining standards of living,
health care, and education that are prevalent in the Caspian Region).
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aid the economies of the littoral states as they struggle to overcome decades
of Soviet neglect.
III. LAKE/SEA QUESTION AND CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS
The Caspian is unique in that it has held many different classifications,
including all of the following: "lake," "enclosed sea," "closed sea," "inland
sea," "sea," and "unique body of water."' 30 Factually, the Caspian is the
largest lake in the world.31 However, the multi-faceted designations that are
used to describe the Caspian prove problematic now that the Caspian's
resources must be apportioned among five countries because each different
designation alters the legal rules used to apportion boundaries and resources.
As will be shown in this section, classification as a sea produces very
different results from that of a lake when international rules are applied to
delimit maritime boundaries. 32
The choice of law determination is important to the littoral states as they
struggle to define the boundaries of the Caspian. 33 Although it appears that
no legal scheme exists that the parties can be forced to use, the parties can
use other established frameworks to guide their negotiations. Therefore,
because the delimitation of boundaries often depends upon the classification
of the body of water, the question of whether the Caspian is a lake or a sea
becomes increasingly important. 34 The littoral states should decide whether
under international maritime law the Caspian is a sea, or whether it should be
classified as a lake because it does not have the characteristics of a true sea.35
If the Caspian is classified as a sea, the rules for delimitation in the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter UNCLOS), which
30 William Constantinos Papadopoulous, Note, International Law & Pipeline
Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea, 36 TEX. J. Bus. L. 1, 2 (1999).
31 Id.
32 See infra.
33 A boundary is defined as an "imaginary line which divides two pieces of land [or
water] from one another." Mary Ellen O'Connell, Commissions for the Peaceful
Settlement of International Boundary Issues 1 (May 19, 2000) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
34 Azerbaijan & The Transcaucasus-The Caspian Demarcation Problem, supra
note 24.
35 Id. Part IX, art. 122 of UNCLOS defines "enclosed or semi-enclosed sea" as a
body of water with an outlet to the sea or ocean. United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1984). The
Caspian does not have an outlet to another sea or an ocean, and thus does not meet this
technical definition.
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grants a twelve-mile territorial water zone 36 followed by a two-hundred mile
exclusive economic rights zone, 37 could be applicable. 38 However, if the
Caspian is classified a lake, "the border is drawn on a median line," typically
from equidistant points. 39
Once the choice of law determination is made, the parties will be able to
deal with the more practical aspects of the legal determination, as they use
dispute resolution mechanisms to actually determine the littoral states'
technical borders in the Caspian. Although these mechanisms are known as
"alternatives" in American legal terminology, international parties do not
regard them as alternatives, but rather as the "norm." 40 The use of these
methods can provide disputants with options on how to apply the rules
established. 41 As a result, dispute resolution does not end once the choice of
law determination is made, but rather becomes more important because the
36 A nation's territorial sea is defined as the waters lying "beyond its coast or the
boundary of its internal waters." UNCLOS, supra note 35, Part II, art. 3. Nations have
more authority over their internal waters than their territorial seas. The main difference is
that ships of other countries can freely cross territorial seas in peacetime. Various nations
have set different outer limits for their territorial sea. Most of the approximately 120
coastal nations have a limit of twelve or fewer nautical miles based upon the UNCLOS
provision that a territorial sea is twelve miles. Id.
37 An exclusive economic zone extends 200 miles from shore, and grants the costal
state "sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and
managing the natural resources." UNCLOS, supra note 35, Part. V, art. 56, 57.
38 Christopher Pala, Russia's Caspian View Violates Law, in Eyes of Kazakhstan's
Minister, PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS (New York), Nov. 22, 1994, at 1. However, since the
parties to the dispute are not signatories to UNCLOS, it will not apply unless the parties
want it to apply. Furthermore, the 200-mile economic zone is questionable because the
Caspian is not wide enough to provide each country with its own two hundred mile zone.
Therefore, the actual zones would have to be negotiated by the parties.
39 Id. Dispute resolution becomes especially relevant when these principles are
called into play because the countries involved must determine which points to use and
where to draw the lines. This often requires numerous attempts at negotiation or
mediation. When equidistant principles are used in delimitation, the result is more likely
to ensure equity and proportionality. Brice M. Clagett, Ownership of Seabed and Subsoil
Resources in the Caspian Sea Under the Rules of International Law, CASPIAN
CROSSROADS MAG., Fall 1995, at http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/
usazerb/131.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2002) (suggesting that the paramount requirement is
a "reasonable degree of proportionality between the lengths of the relevant coasts of the
state parties ... and the quantity of maritime space assigned to those states[,]" because
proportionality does not have to be precise).
40 Mary Ellen O'Connell, Introduction to the Study of International Dispute
Resolution 5 (Fall 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
41 Id. at 1.
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intricacies of demarcation can develop into tense situations. Dispute
resolution methods must be used to prevent aggression and hostilities so the
process can move along rapidly. As shown below, international law is
available to resolve the strictest of legal questions and provide legal schemes
for resolution, but in complex border disputes, many of the most important
decisions can be and actually are made by the parties through methods like
negotiation, mediation, and conciliation. 42
A. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNCLOS is one of the legal frameworks available to the parties that may
help resolve the dispute in the Caspian region. "The 1982 Law of the Sea
Treaty... was drafted as a framework for identifying and resolving
problems that may develop with regard to jurisdiction in ocean and maritime
environmental situations that could arise during the exploration of various
regions." 43 This treaty is considered to be the "best collective wisdom on
laws to govern waters that are shared by two or more states."'44 Since its
inception, approximately 135 countries have become signatories.45 However,
the unique makeup of the Caspian has prevented scholars from establishing a
"ready geological and legal classification." 46 Technically, the Caspian does
not fall under the jurisdiction of UNCLOS because it is neither an "enclosed
42 See infra Part V.
43 Dubner, supra note 17, at 254.
44 Jonas, supra note 6, at 60. UNCLOS "takes into account centuries of rules
developed to control international navigation, maritime borders, and the use of ocean
resources" while also addressing modem concerns like the role of technology, the
environment, and the need for peaceful resolution of disputes. Id.
45 Id. A sea is defined as "a major body of water with an outlet to another major
body of water," such as the Black Sea and its outlet to the Mediterranean. Mary Ellen
O'Connell, The Application of International Law to the Contemporary Security Agenda,
Occasional Paper International Relations Seminar Series 1997, at 30 (Johns Hopkins U.
Bologna Center, No. 2). Since the Caspian Sea does not have an outlet to another major
body of water, its status cannot be technically that of a sea.
Delimitation is defined as "the legal science of dividing sea territory between
neighboring coastal states that share common waters, especially if they are
geographically positioned adjacent or opposite of each other." Sanei, supra note 9, at
790.
However, none of the five littoral states involved in this dispute are parties to the
Convention; therefore there is no mandatory application of UNCLOS rules and
procedures. For UNCLOS to apply in this situation, all five states would have to agree to
its application. Sanei, supra note 9, at 796.
46 Mehdiyoun, supra note 3, at 179.
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sea" nor an "international lake" under the specific definitions promulgated
through UNCLOS. 47 While the actual label placed on a body of water may
seem insignificant, the category actually "determines which body of law
applies to delimitation of the waters and the resources of the subsoil. '48
UNCLOS can therefore provide only a framework to identify and resolve
problems dealing with jurisdiction in ocean and maritime situations when, as
here, the parties are not signatories to UNCLOS. 49
UNCLOS does not govern inland lakes or other inland bodies of water,
and if the Caspian is declared a lake, its resources could be jointly developed
without the application of UNCLOS guidelines. 50 If the Caspian were
declared a sea, governable by the Law of the Sea, then "full maritime
boundaries for the five littoral states would be created based upon an
equidistant division of the sea and undersea resources into national
sectors." 51 Additionally, according to the International Court of Justice, "the
use of the equidistance method of delimitation [is] not obligatory, and other
factors ha[ve] to be taken into account, including factors such as: the general
configuration of the coasts; the physical and geological structures and natural
resources of the shelf, and; the principal of proportionality. ' 52 However, the
parties can agree to use an already established legal regime like UNCLOS
that could be adapted to their situation if they choose to resolve the dispute
through negotiation, mediation, or conciliation, rather than through
international courts.
47 Jonas, supra note 6, at 60. The Caspian is not an "enclosed sea" for the following
reasons: (1) "for centuries, the countries surrounding the Caspian have exercised
exclusive control over its use"; (2) it has "no internationally navigable outlet"; (3) it has
"no contact with the world's oceans"; and (4) "the only navigable outlets are long inland
Russian waterways that cannot be used without Russian permission." Id. The Caspian is
not an "international lake" for the following reasons: (1) it bears the oceanographic
characteristics of a sea, and (2) the number of surrounding states makes an agreement on
use, resources, and boundaries very difficult. Id.
48 Mehdiyoun, supra note 3, at 179-80.
49 Dubner, supra note 17, at 254.
50 Papadopoulous, supra note 30, at 7-9.
51 Id. at7.
52 Id. at 12 (citing North Sea Continental Shelf Case (W. Germany v. Den., W.
Germany v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3). This is especially important, considering the unique
geographical makeup of the Caspian, with its very steep southern basin, which may lend
itself to the designation of a "special circumstance."
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B. Negotiations Since 1990
Negotiations concerning the demarcation of.the Caspian have been
ongoing for over a decade in an effort to finalize boundaries so that
hydrocarbon resource development can proceed.53 Because oil and gas
development of the Caspian continental shelf, a potential profit machine in
the Caspian region, is impacted by the question of offshore boundaries, it is
vital that this dispute be resolved.54 Consequently, the five littoral states have
established a "Special Working Group," which has met periodically for the
past several years to determine how to govern the Caspian.55 Despite the
establishment of the Special Working Group, negotiations have not resolved
the boundaries so that development of the Caspian can resume.
Consequently, it becomes necessary to look to some other means of resolving
the dispute.
The negotiations that have occurred between the littoral states appear to
have consisted primarily of some governmental officials engaging in
consultations, but not all of the talks have included all of the countries
involved. 56 Based on the principles of negotiation, these multi-party
negotiations could be very harmful to the process, as mistrust could grow
among the parties.57 It does not appear that one country has taken the lead to
serve as a mediator, and the parties have not requested third-party
53 Denise Albrighton & Christian Lowe, Opposing Sides in Caspian Oil Dispute
Remain Oceans Apart, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Feb. 12, 2002, available at 2002 WL
2338517. Many foreign oil companies are hesitant to develop the Caspian's resources
without permanent boundaries in place. Id.
54 Caspian Border Dispute Is Latest Woe, supra note 4, at 3. "Failure to resolve the
issue has hindered development of the [Caspian] region .... " Denise Albrighton, Iran,
Azeri Feud Ups Stakes in Tense Caspian Oil Talks, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Aug. 3, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 24983545. See also Albrighton & Lowe, supra note 53 (stating
that the dispute is of "vital importance because the stalemate is putting a brake on
development of the Caspian's resources").
55 Sanei, supra note 9, at 752.
56 See Putin Hosts "No-Ties" CIS Summit in Seaside Resort, AGENCE FR. PRESSE,
Aug. 2, 2001, available at 2001 WL 24982960 (describing a summit during which Russia
and the former Soviet republics gathered to discuss Caspian policies and held several bi-
and multi- lateral meetings without Iranian representatives in attendance).
57 See David M. Rothenberg, Negotiation and Dispute Resolution in the Sri Lankan
Context: Lessons from the 1994-1995 Peace Talks, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 505, 526
(1998) (discussing how a lack of, trust can seriously harm talks between parties).
Additionally, parties may tend to be suspicious of deals created by combinations of other
countries when all of the parties are not present.
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intervention (and have rejected offers from both the United States and
Turkey to act as mediators). 58 However, Russia has certainly taken an active
role in attempting to bring the parties to the table in a "spirit of cooperation
based on common principles and understandings." 59
The five littoral states began meeting as early as 1993 in an attempt to
resolve the border delimitation issues. 60 In 1993, the Caspian littoral states
met in Russia and agreed to use median-line principles. 61 However,
negotiations stalled when no formal agreement was reached, and in 1995
Russia and Iran were still claiming common ownership as a legal regime for
the Caspian. 62 To help facilitate talks among the states, "[t]he five littoral
58 Because the United States has vocally supported Azerbaijan's position, it is
understandable that the other parties may not want U.S. intervention due to potential bias.
See US Backs Baku in Caspian Dispute with Tehran, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Aug. 16,
2001, available at 2001 WL 22005637.
59 Jonas, supra note 6, at 60. Russian President Putin even volunteered to lead
negotiations in August 2001. Albrighton, supra note 53. Russia is probably the most
powerful country bordering the Caspian, and it may feel obligated to push the
negotiations along (and probably wants to push negotiations so that it will have clear
access to some of the oil reserves).
60 See Caspian Border Dispute Is Latest Woe, supra note 4, at 3.
61 Papadopoulous, supra note 30, at 6. The Russian position on the Caspian has been
plagued with internal controversy and division. See Mehdiyoun, supra note 3, at 186
(stating that the Foreign Ministry was calling Azeri actions illegal, while the Ministry of
Fuel and Power was preparing to work with Azerbaijan on oil projects). Russia's original
position seemed to be that the Soviet and Persian Treaties of 1921 and 1940 were still
valid and, as such, the Caspian's legal regime remained that ofjoint utilization. Id. at 185.
The coastal states were also bound by the agreements because of the 1991 "Alma Ata
Declaration," reinforcing the notion that "successor states [ ] had inherited the treaty
obligations of the former unitary state." Id. at 185-86.
62 Papadopoulous, supra note 30, at 7. In 1996, Russia pointed out that it would
claim the borders of the former U.S.S.R. are valid, under the uti posseditis principle of
land boundary law, whereby "the one possessing the thing continues to possess it."
O'Connell, supra note 40 (manuscript at 29). Professor O'Connell states: "That rule [uti
posseditis] means that boundaries-of whatever kind: administrative, colonial,
provincial-which existed upon a state becoming independent remain the boundaries."
Id. at 29-30. Although this principle has been used by the International Court of Justice
with respect to land disputes, in maritime situations "the general rule is that the equi-
distance line of the land boundary is continued seaward," but cases may be decided on a
case-by-case basis, and the rule can be "modified for special circumstances." Id. at 30;
UNCLOS, supra note 36, at art. 74. Early in the discussions regarding the status of the
Caspian, Russia was a proponent of a condominium system that would allow access to all
of the littoral states on an equal basis. Sanei, supra note 9, at 761. Russia advocated the
condominium system because Russia insisted that because the Caspian Sea was a
landlocked lake, UNCLOS did not apply. Id. at 760. Russian officials opined that the
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states have created a Caspian Center in Baku to coordinate efforts to resolve
the[ ] boundary disputes. 63
In 1996, Moscow and Tehran worked together to convince the other
littoral states that the Caspian was not a sea, but rather a large lake, and no
wealth extracted from the Caspian could be disposed of without consent from
all bordering states.64 This follows the common ownership stance strongly
advocated by the two nations.
On the other hand, Turkmenistan has not put forth a consistent position
with regard to the Caspian. In 1993, Turkmenistan passed a law declaring
jurisdiction over a twelve-mile territorial sea. 65 However, later Turkmenistan
declared that the Caspian was a "unique body of water to which all littoral
states should have access." 66 Recently, the Turkmen officials seemed to
change their minds by advocating sectoral division.67
In February 1998, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan reached a "general
understanding on the division of the seabed according to an equidistant
line." 68 Then, in August, Azerbaijan announced that Russia had also agreed
Caspian should have a "special rights" status regarding natural resources, based upon the
Soviet-Iranian treaties of the early twentieth century. Id. As a result, the resources would
be shared by all of the littoral states. O'Connell, supra note 40 (manuscript at 30-31).
63 Papadopoulous, supra note 30, at 7.
64 Moorad Mooradian, The Energized Mediation Process for Karabagh, ARMENIAN
REP., Apr. 6, 1996, at 6, available at 1996 WL 15835041. Initially, it was thought that
Russia and Iran believed the Caspian is a lake with common resources, while the other
nations argued that it was a sea with national sectors. Cullen, supra note 7, at 13.
However, as can be seen in this section, as the five countries continue to negotiate in
Baku, some of the positions have shifted. Id.
65 Sanei, supra note 9, at 757.
66 Id. at 758.
67 Id. In July 2001, President Saparmurad Niyazov of Turkmenistan announced that
he had invited the five Caspian heads of state to a summit in Ashgabat October 26-27,
2001, to further define the status of the Caspian. However, this twice-postponed summit
never occurred in 2001 due to the events of September 11 th and was rescheduled for
April 2002 in Turkmenistan. Caspian Sea Negotiators Note Headway on Status Dispute,
AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Jan. 24, 2002, available at 2002 WL 2324341; see also Azerbaijan
and Russia Agree on the Lease of Soviet-Built Military Radar, Discuss Caspian, TURKISH
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 26, 2002, available at 2002 WL 2214729. It was believed that the
presidential summit would lead to the signing of a general accord that would settle the
legal status of the Caspian. Isabel Gorst, Iranian Minister in Moscow for Talks on
Caspian Sea, PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS (Moscow), Aug. 9, 2001, at 5. However, as late as
August 2001, Russia had not made its position on the Caspian clear, but at the same time
criticized Azerbaijan for exploring disputed areas. See Mehdiyoun, supra note 3, at 186.
68 Mehdiyoun, supra note 3, at 185. Azerbaijan has consistently held that UNCLOS
should apply to the Caspian Sea division. Sanei, supra note 9, at 755. The application of
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to the equidistant line principle instead of common ownership. 69 In early
2001, newspapers reported that a boundary agreement was in sight as
Azerbaijan and Russia agreed to draw maritime boundaries across the sea.70
However, Azerbaijan appeared to use the media to further its interests by
stating how Russia and Kazakhstan agreed with its position to divide the
Caspian based on "international principles" (i.e., UNCLOS). 71 Azerbaijan
spoke with what appeared to be the support of Russia and Kazakhstan while
denouncing the actions of Iran in the southern Caspian when it forced an
UNCLOS would treat the Caspian as a sea and recognize territorial seas and exclusive
economic zones. Id. See also Storm in a Precious Teacup, ECONOMIST (London), Aug. 4,
2001, available at 2001 WL 7320008 (discussing each state having its own territorial
zone). Azerbaijan has strongly advocated this position from the beginning because
approximately 80% of Azeri energy production comes from offshore oil fields. Sanei,
supra note 9, at 755. Azerbaijan wants the Caspian divided according to median line
principles (also known as equidistance principles) and firmly believes that the 1921 and
1940 treaties between the Soviet Union and Iran are applicable only to fishing rights and
navigation routes. Id.
69 Mehdiyoun, supra note 3, at 184. However, over time the Russian position has
shifted significantly, and in 1996 Russia agreed to the principle of sectoral division.
Sanei, supra note 9, at 762. November 1996 saw a softening of the Russian position, as
the Russians agreed to a "hybrid plan" combining national sectors with shared use and
ownership. Mehdiyoun, supra note 3, at 186. Despite Russian agreement to sectoral
division in principle, Russia's stance is that each state may claim a forty-five nautical
mile territorial sea, but all area beyond the forty-five miles is to be shared. O'Connell,
supra note 40 (manuscript at 31). All of the coastal states, except Azerbaijan, appeared to
support this compromise. Mehdiyoun, supra note 3, at 186. In February 1998, Russia's
position appeared to flip-flop as the oil interests in the government stated that complete
sectoral division-rather than a partial sectoral division-of the Caspian was now the
official Russian position. Id. at 187. And, in a subsequent bilateral treaty with
Kazakhstan, Russia actually divided the northern Caspian seabed according to an
equidistant line. Id. This is not the position put forward by President Putin, who continues
to classify the Caspian as a lake, based upon Soviet treaties with Iran, which would allow
for joint ownership and management. Storm in a Precious Teacup, supra note 68.
70 Caspian Sea Boundary Agreement in Sight, HART'S EUR. OFFSHORE PETROLEUM
NEWSL., Jan. 10, 2001, available at 2001 WL 7166605 (stating that this one agreement
could "trigger a solution" among the littoral states). However, this agreement has not yet
"triggered" a solution, but in 2002 chief negotiators claimed to have "made headway on
all issues related to the adoption of a fixed legal status for [the] Caspian Sea." Caspian
Sea Negotiators Note Headway on Status Dispute, supra note 67.
71 Azerbaijan Claims Russian, Kazakh Support in Border Row with Iran, AGENCE
FR. PRESSE, Aug. 3, 2001, available at 2001 WL 24983767. The Kazakh government has
also advocated the application of UNCLOS, which becomes applicable only if the
Caspian is a "sea" or by agreement of the States. Sanei, supra note 9, at 756. This
position is in line with the Azeri position, and the two countries are seen as close allies in
this regard. Storm in a Precious Teacup, supra note 68.
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Azeri research vessel out of the area.72 Azeri diplomats then revealed to the
press that Russian President Putin was planning a summit of the former
Soviet republics to discuss the status of the Caspian.73
In early August 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with most of
the leaders of the former Soviet republics and held a series of bilateral
meetings to discuss the division of the Caspian Sea.74 Following the regional
scare in July, when hostilities between Azerbaijan and Iran appeared
possible, all of the littoral states seemed to demonstrate a "new willingness to
finally solve the decade-old oil dispute." 75
Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan all support maintaining the "status
quo" in the Caspian region by establishing each country's share of the Sea so
that the share would correspond roughly to the national boundaries of each
littoral state. 76 However, an agreement of this sort would not allow Iran to
receive any more of the Caspian than it had under old boundary agreements
with the Soviet Union.77
Due to Azerbaijan's firm "refusal to accept 'shared ownership' and
Russia's shifting position vis-d-vis the principle of condominium," 78 Iran has
72 Azerbaijan Claims Russian, Kazakh Support in Border Row with Iran, supra note
71.
73 Id. This could be problematic, as the states could come to terms with an
agreement and then "muscle" Iran (the left-out state) into an agreement with which it
does not agree.
74 See Putin Hosts "No-Ties" CIS Summit in Seaside Resort, supra note 56.
75 Id. (referring to the after effects of the confrontation in which an Iranian military
vessel forced an Azeri research ship out of disputed territory).
76 Azerbaijan Claims Russian, Kazakh Support in Border Row with Iran, supra note
71.
77 Id.
78 Mehdiyoun, supra note 3, at 183. The condominium principle provides for shared
property and may be based upon res communis principles, which provide that a thing may
be used commonly by all, but it can never be exclusively acquired as a whole. See Sanei,
supra note 9, at 802. Although Russia and Iran have both advocated this position at one
time or another, it is rarely used between states in cases involving shared ownership of
mineral resources. Id. In fact, some legal scholars dispute whether common ownership of
lakes and inland seas does in fact actually exist. See Clagett, supra note 39 (stating that
"Verzijl, a leading scholar... after an exhaustive study concluded that examples of
common ownership 'do not to my knowledge actually exist."'). Actually, the Gulf of
Fonseca Case (Case Concerning the Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El
Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), 1992 I.C.J. 351) is the only case supporting
the use of condominium principles. Sanei, supra note 9, at 802-03. However, because the
situation in the Gulf of Fonseca is so different from the situation in the Caspian region, it
is hardly a useful comparison. See generally id. at 803-05. Most other international lakes
are completely divided among the littoral states-the Great Lakes between Canada and
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now become isolated as the lone advocate for shared resources. Although
Iran originally was not alone on the shared principles approach, it has now
become its single supporter. It has become apparent that the five states now
agree on the principle that the seabed should be divided into national sectors.
However, a "sticking point" has developed due to Iran's adamant
requirement of equal shares when the Caspian is finally divided. 79 Despite
the United States and Bodensee (also known as Lake Constance) among Austria,
Germany, and Switzerland-not subject to some condominium scheme, as Azerbaijan
and Turkmenistan have argued in the past. O'Connell, supra note 40 (manuscript at 31).
79 Jonas, supra note 6, at 60. Iran has repeatedly stated that it would like to resolve
the Caspian dispute through "peaceful means and understanding." Iran Calls for Peaceful
Solution to Caspian Oil Dispute with Azerbaijan, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Hong Kong),
Aug. 6, 2001, available at 2001 WL 26356398. Because sectoral division based upon a
median line (under which each state would receive a share of the Caspian proportional to
its shoreline) would afford Iran the smallest portion of the Caspian, it has vehemently
opposed any type of median division and instead advocates equal division among the
littoral states. Sanei, supra note 9, at 763-64. Iranian municipal law recognizes the
Caspian as a "closed sea," which would provide for no division-only equal access. Id. at
774. However, "[i]n September 1998, Iran officially announced its acceptance of the
principle of sectoral division, on the condition that a single division scheme be applied to
both the waters and the seabed." Mehdiyoun, supra note 3, at 183 (this is a change from
its original position of shared ownership). Because median line division would not
increase Iran's share of the Caspian, it is the most vocal proponent of an equal (20%
each) division scheme. Id. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Ahani has indicated that
Iran and Turkmenistan are closely aligned in their views on the Caspian; however,
Turkmenistan has shifted its position, making it hard to determine if Foreign Minister
Ahani is still accurate in his statement. Market Awaits Storage Report for Clear Gas
Pricing Signal, OIL DAILY (Washington, D.C.), Aug. 13, 2001, available at 2001 WL
14946513.
It is unlikely that Iran will agree to the current proposals concerning the delimitation
of the Caspian Sea because it will receive the smallest share of the resources. Right now
the countries are split between dividing the Caspian according to shoreline, on equidistant
(proportional) principles, and dividing it equally among the five states. Nedbayeva, supra
note 11. Iran and Turkmenistan are the only countries advocating the equal division of
the Caspian. Id. Iran's stance on the Caspian is not expected to change. In fact, the
Iranian government has officially warned many international oil companies that any
contracts in the disputed area of the Caspian are "illegal." Vladimir Socor, The Guns of
Summer: Iran Prowls the Caspian, WALL ST. J. EUR. (New York), Aug. 3, 2001, at 7.
Iran also stated that further exploration in the Iran/Azerbaijan disputed area requires
Iranian permission and that noncompliant companies would be excluded from future
Irania oil projects in the Persian Gulf. Id. Perhaps most disturbing, Iran warned that it
reserved the right to repeat military action in the Caspian. Id. The Iranian government and
media have been relatively silent concerning recent developments regarding the Caspian
delimitation; however, Mehdi Safari, Iran's special envoy on Caspian issues, has voiced
opposition to unilateral measures and has stated that "Iran reserves the right to refer the
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the littoral countries' failure to agree on where to establish the demarcation
lines so that special factors (like shoreline length) could be taken into
account, the views of the five states now appear to converge as they discuss
individual versus shared control.80
Because the Sea must now be apportioned among so many states,
estimates are frequently made regarding each littoral state's current portion
of the coastline as an indicator of what each country's "share" of the
Caspian's resources should be once divided, if an apportionment method is
used. 81
C. Outside Involvement
Because negotiations have produced few tenable results, it is likely that
some form of outside involvement is necessary to bring about a resolution to
the dispute. The United States has played an important role in this dispute
due to its interest in Caspian oil. 82 Because the United States desires to
continue the sanctions against Iran, it strongly advocates any type of legal
matter to international arbitration." BP Defies Iran Over Caspian, IRAN TIMEs
(Washington, D.C.), Dec. 14, 2001, at 1. However, if the dispute is actually referred to
arbitration, it is unlikely that Iran will prevail with its 20% equal division scheme.
80 Jonas, supra note 6, at 60.
81 Sanei, supra note 9, at 694 (the figures found in this article are identical to those
represented in the chart below under percent of total coastline). See also Mehdiyoun,
supra note 3, at 179 (However, these figures do vary slightly with other estimates. Iran's
share has been estimated from 13-18.7% in other sources). A comparison of percentages
of total coastline and the percent of the total Caspian Sea produces slightly different
figures. See Clagett, supra note 39. The figures are estimated as follows:
Percent of Total Percent of TotalCoastline Caspian Sea
Azerbaiian 15.2 20.7
Iran 18.7 14.6
Kazakhstan 30.8 29.9
Russia 18.5 15.6
Turkmenistan 16.8 19.2
Id.
82 See Papadopoulous, supra note 30, at 21. Some Middle Eastern scholars have
accused the United States of encouraging oil companies to enter the region so that the
United States can gain footing and bring NATO into the region, especially because the
United States has diplomatic ties with all -of the countries in the area, except Iran.
Professor Says Wise Diplomacy Needed on Caspian Issue, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION
(Washington, D.C.), Aug. 5, 2001, available at 2001 WL 26897453.
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regime that will keep oil and pipelines running away from Iran. In particular,
it has openly supported the Azerbaijan position of median line division,
which would provide the Azeri government with great oil resources that
could flow out to Western Europe, away from Iran and the Persian Gulf. In
fact, the United States has been accused of "fanning the flames" and pitting
the other littoral states against Iran.83
During the 1990s, the United States began to push its involvement in the
Caspian region by stating that the Caspian is a "region of its national
strategic interests. ' 84 The United States even discussed with Azeri President
Heydar Aliyev the possibility of locating a U.S. military base in
Azerbaijan. 85 The Russians and Iranians see the West as backing Azerbaijan
and Kazakhstan because oil companies have already heavily invested in the
region. 86 Consequently, although a third-party mediator or conciliator may be
necessary to resolve the Caspian dispute, it is likely that Western nations in
strong alliance with the United States may not be regarded as effective
choices due to a perceived lack of neutrality. 87
IV. COMPARATIVE SITUATIONS-How BORDER DISPUTES HAVE BEEN
RESOLVED ELSEWHERE
All territorial divisions are unique-whether the division involves water
or land. Likewise, the parties involved respond differently to various dispute
resolution techniques-some disputes are resolved through negotiations,
while others require court involvement. However, an examination of two
similar situations where countries resolved territorial disputes regarding lakes
may provide insight into methods of resolving the Caspian Sea dispute.
Because most lakes are small bodies of water shared between two
countries via bilateral agreements, controversy over international laws does
83 Professor Says Wise Diplomacy Needed on Caspian Issue, supra note 82.
84 Rahr, supra note 1, at 81.
85 Arthur L. Lowrie, U.S. Foreign Policy Revolves Around New Dynamics, TAMPA
TRIB., Aug. 12, 2001, at 4, available at 2001 WL 5509795 (reviewing MICHAEL T.
KLARE, RESOURCE WARS: THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF GLOBAL CONFLICT (2001)).
86 Storm in a Precious Teacup, supra note 68.
87 This lack of neutrality became even more apparent when newspapers reported that
the Bush White House reaffirmed the United States' commitment to "local western-
aligned oil players such as Azerbaijan and ensuring that the Caspian's two wild cards,
Iran and Russia, are sidelined as much as possible from controlling the sea's oil wealth."
Owen Matthews, Caspian Sea States Wrestle over Oil Riches, SCOTSMAN (Edinburgh),
Sept. 1,2001, at 10.
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not frequently ensue. 88 However, precedents do exist for the peaceful
division of lakes between two or more states. 89 At one end of the spectrum
are the Great Lakes, the rights to which were determined through
negotiations between the United States and Canada. At the other end of the
spectrum is Lake Constance, which was divided among three European states
through litigation in the court system. Although the Caspian Sea negotiators
have attempted to resolve the dispute in a manner similar to the Great Lakes,
they have done so without success. Because negotiations have failed, it
appears that the parties are moving toward a situation very similar to Lake
Constance.9" A solution to the Caspian Sea dispute probably lies somewhere
in the middle-with the parties utilizing a third-party mediator or
conciliation commission.
A. Great Lakes
While the dispute in the Caspian region is not as easy to resolve as the
Great Lakes situation, Caspian Sea negotiators can nevertheless use elements
of the Great Lakes negotiations as examples or frameworks to move the
parties closer to resolution of the dispute.91 The Great Lakes delimitation is
an example for Caspian negotiators to imitate because the Great Lakes were
delimited through negotiation according to an equidistant method in 1783, as
have several other lakes in the intervening years.92 The fact that the Great
Lakes situation was resolved through negotiation is significant because the
Great Lakes contain many resources that need to be managed by the United
States and Canada. The Great Lakes basin covers 95,000 square miles of
water surface, and is the largest body of freshwater in the world. 93 Because
88 Iran: Paper Views Problems with Caspian Sea Legal Regime, supra note 5.
89 Croissant & Croissant, supra note 2 (citing the following examples: "Lake
Victoria (among Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda), Lake Malawi (between Malawi and
Mozambique), the Great Lakes of North America (between Canada and the United
States), Lake Titicaca (between Bolivia and Peru), and Lake Geneva (between France and
Switzerland)").
90 See infra Part IV.A.
91 The Great Lakes situation was probably resolved easily due to the extremely
friendly relations between the two countries.
92 Clagett, supra note 39. In fact, the author listed four other lakes that have been
delimited by equidistant principles, including Lakes Geneva, Tanganyika, Lugano, and
Maggiore. Id. (discussing the fact that the majority of treaties delimiting boundaries in
lakes or inland seas have adopted median or equidistant principles).
93 Mark J. Dinsmore, Like a Mirage in the Desert: Great Lakes Water Quantity
Preservation Efforts and Their Punitive Effects, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 449, 449 (1993). The
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these lakes are situated between two countries, the best tactic available to
manage the lakes was a treaty that served to control the use of the water and
its resources. 94
Because the Great Lakes basin is such a valuable resource to both the
United States and Canada, both countries entered into the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909 as a way of preventing further disputes.95 In fact, as part of
that treaty, the parties created the International Joint Commission to have
jurisdiction over all boundary water disputes. 96 As a result, a mechanism of
resolving disputes was created before any major disputes arose. Although the
parties to the Caspian dispute must first resolve their underlying problems
before they can address future disputes, the framework for this type of
dispute resolution is available. If the Caspian littoral states were able to
create a similar arrangement, many future disputes could be avoided-
especially in light of the immense natural resources estimated to exist
beneath the Caspian that will inevitably create future controversies between
the littoral states once further oil explorations begin.
As far as resources of the Great Lakes are concerned, a consent provision
exists, similar to the provision requested by Turkmenistan, 97 which would
require all of the Caspian littoral states to consent to resource extraction. 98 In
the Great Lakes Charter (a document expressing the agreement between the
United States and Canada concerning resources), the fourth principle is
"Prior Notice and Consultation," requiring notification and consent of the
other country before water resources can be consumed. 99 Similar provisions
Great Lakes represent 95% of the United States' fresh surface water and 20% of the
world's fresh surface water. Id.
94 See id. at 450 (speaking of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 and the
establishment of the International Joint Commission).
95 Id. at 455-56 (stating that the "principal purpose of the treaty was to 'ensure the
equitable sharing of boundary waters between Canada and the United States"').
96 Id. at 456. Article VII of the Boundary Waters Treaty created the Commission,
giving it jurisdiction over "all disputes concerning boundary waters between the two
countries," but providing that its decisions are merely advisory, unless a binding decision
is requested by one of the countries involved in the dispute. Id. It is this type of
preventative dispute resolution that has made the original treaties so effective, because
the "resolution of most issues relies on the good faith efforts of the affected nation." Id.
97 See infra Part III.B.
98 One advantage the Great Lakes system has over the Caspian is that the individual
state boundaries have already been laid out, making it easier to regulate the rights to
resources and require consent in certain areas. See Dinsmore, supra note 93, at 464.
99 Id. at 462. The Great Lakes Charter provides as follows:
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have been suggested in the Caspian situation, and theoretically could work to
prevent problems in the interim before a final agreement on division is
reached. 100 However, practically speaking, a consent document is unlikely
because some of the littoral states have already been begun engaging in
limited oil exploration due to the downturn in the economy.' 01
Caspian negotiators should note that diversions of water from the Great
Lakes are determined by equitable apportionment.' 0 2 In light of the Great
Lakes situation, littoral states could reasonably push for equidistant division,
possibly demonstrating to Iran that international norms provide for
equitable-not equal-apportionment. Even if a third-party mediator or
conciliator is brought into the Caspian situation, based on the result reached
in the Great Lakes, a similar result is possible for the Caspian Sea.
It is the intent of the signatory States and Provinces that no Great Lakes State
or Province approve or permit any major new or increased diversion or consumptive
use of the water resources of the Great Lakes Basin without notifying and consulting
with and seeking the consent and concurrence of all affected Great Lakes States and
Provinces.
Id. Despite the fact that the Great Lakes Charter is not binding upon the states, it
represents a "symbolically united political stance." Dr. James P. Hill, Great Lakes
Commentary: The New Politics of Great Lakes Water Diversion: A Canada-Michigan
Interface, 1999 TOL. J. GREAT LAKES' L. SCI. & POL'Y 75, 79.
100 See Christian Lowe, Azerbaijan's President to Visit Moscow for Key Talks,
AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Jan. 24, 2002, available at 2002 WL 2323892 (stating that Russia,
Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan have "agreed to respect each other's boundaries").
101 Id. (stating that "Iran and Turkmenistan are eyeing mineral reserves in
Azerbaijan's sector of the sea"). Contra Russian Envoy Slams Turkmen Stance on
Caspian, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Aug. 31, 2001, available at 2001 WL 25001939 (stating
that Turkmenistan and Iran are calling for a moratorium on oil exploration in the disputed
areas of the Caspian Sea). Despite the undecided borders in the Caspian, many major oil
companies have already begun exploration in the Caspian region. Angela Charlton,
Caspian Sea Dispute Gains Urgency, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 27, 2002, available at
2002 WL 14995213 (referring to Exxon, Mobil, BP, Chevron, and Russian oil company
Lukoil).
102 See Julia R. Wilder, Note, The Great Lakes as a Water Resource: Questions of
Ownership and Control, 59 IND. L.J. 463, 485-86 (1984). Equidistant divisions refer to
the situations where a median line is drawn in a body of water and proportional sectors
are apportioned to the states involved, thus providing for equitable apportionment.
Clagett, supra note 39. In the Caspian, the parties have basically agreed that some form
of equidistant division is necessary, but Iran and Turkmenistan insist that the national
sectors be divided equally, rather than proportionally. Turkmenistan Proposes Caspian
Summit in April, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Mar. 6, 2002, available at 2002 WL 2355195.
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B. Lake Constance
In some border division situations it is necessary for the parties to use a
court system in order for the dispute to be resolved. For example, in 1920 it
was necessary for the Reichsgericht, the former German federal court, to
apply principles of international law requiring Lake Constance be divided by
equidistant boundaries among Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. 10 3
However, since that time, the countries bordering Lake Constance have
reached other agreements regarding different aspects of sharing the Lake,
from water withdrawal to fishing. 10 4 Most importantly, the parties agreed to
develop rules concerning an arbitration commission to settle disputes that the
parties could not settle by diplomatic means. 10 5 The parties had the foresight
to lay the groundwork and establish the rules governing a dispute before
further disputes arose-the agreement details how arbitrators will be
selected, what the arbitrators will base their decision upon, and the binding
nature of the arbitrator's decision. 106 The parties to the agreement selected a
method of dispute resolution-arbitration-organized the important aspects
of implementation and enforcement, and reduced their agreement to writing.
It will be useful for the Caspian negotiators to understand that the
situation regarding Lake Constance is quite similar to the Caspian because
Lake Constance has more than two countries bordering the lake, and
therefore it is likely that any mechanism involving an international legal
system can be resolved similarly. Lake Constance provides the negotiators
apportioning the Caspian with yet another example of an equidistant,
equitable boundary scheme that has achieved positive results. More
importantly, Lake Constance demonstrates the necessity not only of
establishing good diplomatic relations among the littoral states, but also of
103 Clagett, supra note 39. In fact, the author goes so far as to state that a court
would "hold it to be a principle of customary international law that waters should be
divided, unless a particular situation presented special geographic and historic fact that
dictated a different result." Id. It is hard to determine whether any geographic or
historical facts might group the Caspian situation into this caveat. However, the parties to
the Caspian dispute should not need to look to courts to resolve the dispute-they should
be able to do so independently of a structured court system.
104 See Agreement Regulating the Withdrawal of Water from Lake Constance, Apr.
30, 1966, art. 3, available at http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/RegionalDocs/Lake-
Constance.htm.
10 5 Id. at art. 10.
106 Id at art. 10-11.
[Vol. 18:2 2003]
CASPIAN SEA
setting the groundwork for dispute resolution mechanisms that can be used in
the future to resolve other disputes.
Since the Caspian holds so many resources, it is inevitable that the
parties to the Caspian demarcation dispute will once again meet at the
negotiating table in another dispute. Therefore, it is essential that as the
parties decide how to divide the Caspian, they also lay the groundwork for
how future disputes will be resolved. The parties involved in the Caspian
dispute will hopefully look at the methods used to resolve similar disputes
and realize that equidistant boundaries are the most commonly applied
method. It is becoming clear that if resolution of the Caspian dispute is
possible, the most likely outcome is equidistant boundaries, regardless of
whether negotiations are used, or a court system. 10 7 Therefore, the parties
should not continue to engage in endless rounds of negotiations, but rather
should employ a mediator or conciliator to help finalize an agreement that
will benefit all of the littoral states. It should be plain that after a decade of
negotiating, with abundant examples of boundary situations to look at for a
division scheme to apply to the Caspian situation, the Caspian negotiations
have reached a stalemate. Something different is needed to resolve the
Caspian dispute. A neutral third party is necessary to assist the parties in
reaching a delimitation decision. The parties must agree to request the
services of either a mediator or conciliation commission if the dispute is ever
going to be resolved in a timely fashion.
V. INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS
Some form of dispute resolution-other than the ongoing negotiations-
is necessary to bring about resolution of the Caspian Sea dispute. The United
Nations Charter reflects a desire for countries to engage in the peaceful
settlement of disputes. 10 8 Some disputes are best resolved by unique
solutions designed by the parties, instead of arbitrary reliance on existing
substantive rules that would otherwise be applicable. One of the biggest
advantages of dispute resolution is that the process typically requires consent,
107 Although Iran could feasibly continue its hard-line position of equal shares for
many years, it appears that the most likely litigated result would be an equidistant
scheme, and it is hoped that Iran would eventually agree to this position.
108 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3 ("All Members shall settle their international
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and
justice, are not endangered."). Article 33 further defines peaceful means as "negotiation,
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional
agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice." Id. at art. 33,
para. 1.
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which "is said to be empowering for disputants who can craft for themselves
a mutually acceptable outcome, unfettered by the restrictions of legal
procedures and remedies." 10 9 Because the parties to the dispute are able to
retain control over the outcome, the result is often more "durable and
forward-looking" than one imposed by a court with a "win/lose"
determination. 110 The techniques of international dispute resolution would
pose different advantages and disadvantages if used in the Caspian Sea
dispute; however it is mediation and conciliation that would likely prove to
be the most effective because a neutral, third party could push the parties
toward resolution.
A. Negotiation
Negotiation is defined as a "process whereby the parties directly
communicate and bargain with each other in an attempt to agree on a
settlement of the issue."' I I1 Negotiation is the most frequently used manner of
dispute resolution in international contexts. 112 Negotiation has already been
utilized in the Caspian Sea dispute with limited success. 113 Some have
suggested that negotiation may be the only way that settlement can actually
be achieved, because the parties are able to deal directly with each other and
109 CHINKIN, supra note 5, at 123 (discussing the well-accepted principle of
mediation that parties are typically more amenable to settling a disagreement if they have
some input into the resolution). See also JAY G. MARTIN & MARK S. ANSHAN,
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR OIL AND GAS PRACTITIONERS 3 (2001) (stating
that party control over the process is one of the major advantages of ADR). This
sentiment is particularly relevant in the Caspian situation because the more input the
littoral states have on the demarcation determination, the more likely they will be to abide
by the decisions made. Additionally, since ADR provides more flexibility in reaching a
conclusion, the parties will not be forced to adhere to one particular legal scheme. See id.
at 12.
110 CHINKIN, supra note 5, at 123-24 (parties are more likely to be unhappy with a
"win/lose" determination than they are to be with a determination that allows each side to
"win" a little).
III Bilder, supra note 5, at 22. Negotiation is also defined as a "[b]ilateral or
multilateral process in which parties who differ over a particular issue attempt to reach
agreement or compromise over that issue through communication." DOUGLAS H. YARN,
DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 314 (1999).
112 Bilder, supra note 5, at 22. The parties are able to retain maximum control over
both the process and outcome when using negotiation. Id.
113 For example, lead party negotiators are moving toward compromise regarding
ownership and management of resources, with the only remaining question being the
specific lines of demarcation. News Briefs: International-Caspian, PLATTS OILGRAM
NEWS (New York), Jan. 23, 2002, at 6.
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craft creative solutions to the demarcation problem."14 However, past
negotiation efforts have been marked with self-serving unilateral and
bilateral declarations. Bilateral negotiations are nothing new to the Caspian
States. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, a host of treaties have been
signed by and among the littoral states. 115 This general disinclination to work
together makes arriving at a mutually acceptable agreement through
114 Because the Caspian demarcation is such a complex problem-dealing with
navigation, fishing, pollution, and natural resources-it should be very helpful to the
parties to be able to maneuver around some previously established legal rules, rather than
be forced to adhere directly to a set legal scheme. Parties are most likely to engage in
negotiations when they feel that results achieved through joint negotiations are better than
alternative agreements. JAMES K. SEBENIUS, NEGOTIATING THE LAW OF THE SEA 72
(1984). If the parties refuse to allow third party intervention, negotiation may be the only
option available to resolve the Caspian dispute. Iran: Daily Says Consultations Vital for
Consensus on Caspian, BBC MONITORING, June 13, 2002, available at 2002 WL
22670118 (stating that "Iran is opposed to the interference of outside powers in Caspian
affairs").
115 "In 1997, Kazakhstan signed a joint communiqud with Turkmenistan pledging to
divide sections of the Caspian along median lines." Papadopoulous, supra note 30, at 8.
Kazakhstan also signed a bilateral agreement in July 1998 with Russia, dividing the
northern Caspian along median lines. Id. However, this is only an interim agreement until
the Caspian status is finalized by the littoral states. It is also interesting because originally
Russia had pushed for common ownership.
Moreover, July 1998 saw an agreement between Iran and Turkmenistan in which
they declared their intent for the Caspian to have coastal zones divided into national
sectors, with the remainder of the Caspian being subject to common ownership. Id. Iran
and Turkmenistan have also expressed their vision that the Caspian be divided only by
consensus among the littoral states. Id. at 9.
Around December 1, 2001, Russia and Azerbaijan signed an agreement to divide the
Caspian seabed between themselves. BP Defies Iran over Caspian, supra note 79. A
previous agreement to divide the seabed by mutual agreement of the five coastal states
was rejected by the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister. Id. Russia and Azerbaijan have
continued to "firm up" this bilateral treaty by signing yet another agreement specifically
demarcating each country's respective share. See Myers, supra note 21, at 13A. It seems
odd that Azerbaijan would enter into this agreement because it had long advocated joint
agreement between the littoral states on the Caspian. Id. This bilateral agreement could
now cause a disadvantage in Azerbaijani dealings with Iran, especially considering the
animosity already existing between the two countries.
Finally, the most recent bilateral agreement was signed in May 2002, between
Russia and Kazakhstan. Pamela Ann Smith, Caspian Oil Race Heats Up, MIDDLE EAST,
July 1, 2002, available at 2002 WL 10347178 (stating that "[a]fter years of negotiation,
President Vladimir Putin of Russia and his Kazakh counterpart, Nursultan Nazarbayev,
signed an accord in Moscow in May dividing the northern quarter of the Caspian Sea
between their two countries").
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negotiation unlikely.'l 6 In order for all five parties to work together and
reach an agreement through negotiation, extensive bargaining will be
necessary 117
The process of negotiation is seen as having a life cycle consisting of
three stages: (1) exchanging demands; (2) discussing issues; and (3) reaching
conclusions. 118 In all reports from summits, presidential visits, and
newspaper accounts, it appears that the parties to the Caspian dispute have
clearly laid out their goals (even if they have been refined over time) and
discussed the merits of the parties' contentions. Now is the time for the
parties to make some decisions that will finally resolve the dispute. If the
Caspian littoral states are actually to reach an agreement, they must be
willing to compromise. In this complex dispute, the parties must be willing to
engage in "give and take" negotiations, where parties are willing to make
trade-offs. However, the decisions that need to be made may only come if
some other third party "pushes" the parties toward an agreement. Although
some parties have agreed to certain bilateral proposals, it will now become
important for the parties to engage in bartering to settle the dispute-a task
that may be best accomplished through a mediator.
B. Mediation
Mediation is distinguished from negotiation by the participation of a
neutral third party mediator who has the ability to bargain directly with the
parties and make substantive settlement proposals. 19 With Iran's hard-line
stance on the division of the Caspian, it appears that some of the other littoral
states will have to come up with concessions in order for Iran to agree to any
proposal other than the one they proposed. Iran's adamant refusal to accept
any proposal other than a 20% equal division has likely been the most
damaging to the negotiations. Unlike a negotiator, who will only strive to
achieve the best result for the party he or she represents, a mediator will
assist the parties in reaching a resolution and eliciting concessions. 12 0
116 Dubner, supra note 17, at 261. Because the parties are not working together
when unilateral declarations are made, and each party only attempts to further that state's
own interests-not the good of the entire region-it will be difficult for the littoral states
to come to a mutually acceptable agreement through negotiation.
'17 Id.
118 See THEODORE W. KHEEL, THE KEYS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 16 (1999).
119 See YARN, supra note 111, at 283.
120 See KHEEL, supra note 118, at 49.
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The challenging aspect of finding an effective mediator to resolve the
Caspian dispute is the necessity of finding a neutral mediator who can
combat the tense political atmosphere in the region.' 21 For example, Iran
does not trust the United States or Turkey, two of the most likely state
candidates to serve as a mediator. 122 In particular, the United States is seen to
invest itself in the region only because of the oil pipeline potential. 123
121 See CPR INST. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, OIL & GAS INDUSTRY ADR 1-8 (1994)
(stating, "[i]t is essential that the mediator be a person in whose integrity and judgment
both sides have full confidence"). It is also important that the mediator be "selected
jointly by the parties," and sometimes, as may be the case with the Caspian dispute, some
knowledge of the subject matter is helpful. Id. Despite the potential advantages that
mediation may bring, because of the mediator's status as a neutral participant in the
Caspian discussions, the parties may not want a mediator. In fact, some statements have
been made that indicate the parties are entirely opposed to the presence of a third party.
See Minister Sets Out Russia's Stance on Caspian, BBC MONITORING, Feb. 26, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 15122650 (reporting Russia's position that "[t]he determination of
the Caspian's legal status, as well as forms and methods of using its water and subsurface
resources, are exclusively the business of the five Caspian states").
122 See Christian Lowe, No Deal on Caspian as Azerbaian President Meets Iran
Envoy, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Aug. 28, 2001, available at 2001 WL 24999477; Iran
Concerned over Turkish Warplanes in Baku, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Aug. 22, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 24995686. Iran's position on parties like NATO and the United
States interfering in the region is very clear: "The peace in the Caspian Sea is seriously
threatened by the presence of numerous regional and ultra-regional powers and conflicts
between their views and interests." Article Regarding Iran-Azerbaijan Relations and the
Situation in the Caspian Sea, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION (Washington, D.C.), Aug. 4,
2001, 2001 WL 27171250. Moreover, so long as millions of dollars worth of natural
resources remain in the Caspian basin, the dispute between the littoral states will not
technically be entirely resolved. Saadet Oruc, Ankara Focuses on Tehran-Baku
Escalation, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Aug. 14, 2001, available at 2001 WL 22005549.
The United States is viewed with great mistrust throughout the Middle East-
particularly in the Muslim world because of U.S. support provided to Israel. Cf Israel
Turns the Screws on Arafat, MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., Sept. 7, 2001, available at 2001 WL
8125133 (stating that President Bush and his advisors have "made clear that they see
merit in the Israeli contention that primary responsibility for the violence lies with
Arafat"). Additionally, Turkey is not seen to be neutral due to its pact on military
cooperation with neighboring Azerbaijan, a close strategic ally and country sharing a
common language with Turkey. Turkey Plans Show of Military Force for Ally
Azerbaijan, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Aug. 17, 2001, available at 2001 WL 24992816.
However, Turkey has stated that it is necessary to resolve disputes peacefully through
dialogue. Turkey Calls for Dialogue on Caspian Sea Oil Dispute, AGENCE FR. PRESSE,
Aug. 8, 2001, 2001 WL 24986600; Turkey Seeks Calm in Caspian, OIL DAILY
(Washington, D.C.), Aug. 14, 2001, at 7, available at 2001 WL 14946217 (referring to
Turkey's urgings to abide by United Nations principles in resolving the dispute). Turkey
has voiced its concern to both Azerbaijan and Iran that negotiations be used instead of
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In some other situations, religious figures, such as high-ranking Roman
Catholic officials, have been able to mediate disputes because they are seen
to have a spiritual authority over the countries involved. 124 However, because
the area surrounding the Caspian is predominately Muslim, it is highly
unlikely that any Christian mediator would be deemed acceptable. Moreover,
even a high-ranking Muslim cleric may prove an unacceptable mediator due
to the varying degrees of Islamic fundamentalism practiced in the region. 125
Therefore, the biggest obstacle the parties may face in choosing a mediator is
ensuring the mediator is acceptable to all of the parties involved. If the
parties are able to agree on one mediator (or a team of mediators), it is likely
that a resolution to the Caspian dispute will be forthcoming. A mediator may
hostilities. Kemal Ilter, Tension Between Azerbaian and Iran in Caspian May Affect
TPAO's Business: Turkey Tells Both Iran and Azerbaijan that the Dispute Should Be
Solved by Negotiations Not by Brute Force, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Aug. 8, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 22005328.
123 Charlton, supra note 101. However, the United States has been an effective
mediator in other international disputes. For example, Former President Jimmy Carter has
had notable success as an international mediator. See George Melloan, The Gnomes of
Oslo Stir Up a Tempest Once More, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2002, at A21. See KHEEL,
supra note 127, at 55 (pointing out that "civility is an essential component of mediation,"
which may explain why Kheel thinks that Former President Carter has been criticized for
appearing "overly friendly" with dictators and other such "scoundrels"). It is reasonable
that the parties to this particular dispute would not want the United States involved-its
open support of the Azerbaijani position and its interest in the potential oil pipelines from
the Caspian makes the United States appear to be somewhat less than disinterested. See
Goodspeed, supra note 27, at A13. See also Pierre Celerier, Azerbaijan's Aliyev and
Putin Hail Deal on Radar Station, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Jan. 25, 2002, available at 2002
WL 2325397.
124 See generally Thomas Princen, International Mediation-The View from the
Vatican, 3 NEGOT. J. 347 (1987). In one instance, a border dispute between Argentina
and Chile (known as the Beagle Channel Dispute) was resolved through the intervention
of Cardinal Antonio Samore, a career Vatican diplomat. Id. at 347. Although the Pope
was the official mediator, a mediation team headed by Cardinal Samore actually
conducted the day-to-day mediation. Id. at 347-48. Although mediator neutrality is key
to the resolution of disputes, because both countries were Catholic nations, the Cardinal's
mediation team was viewed as having the moral authority-and obligation-to intervene
so the matter could be resolved peacefully. Id. at 348-49. Mediator neutrality is essential
to successful dispute resolution because when the mediator is neutral, the parties can
open up to the mediator without fear that their words will be used against them. Id. at 350
(referring to the fact that trust in the mediator is essential and was obtained in the Beagle
Channel situation because the parties trusted the religious figures mediating the dispute).
125 In particular, Iran is noted for its strict adherence to Islamic fundamentalism,
while other countries in the Caspian region are Islamic, but without strict adherence to
Islamic laws within the government.
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be more likely to push the parties toward a peaceful resolution if the mediator
is (1) acceptable to the parties; (2) trusted; and (3) respected in the
international arena.
C. Conciliation
Conciliation has two basic functions: to investigate and clarify the facts
in dispute, and to attempt to bring the parties into agreement by suggesting
mutually acceptable solutions to the problem. 126 The basic premise of
conciliation is that a neutral third party acts as a mediator, attempting to
bring the parties to some sort of agreement, while at the same time
examining evidence and conducting his own investigation by attempting to
clarify the situation. 127 Interestingly, Article 284 of UNCLOS provides that
state parties to disputes under UNCLOS may submit their disputes to
conciliation, but that the submission must be by the consent of all the parties
to the dispute. 128 Conciliation differs from mediation only in that the
conciliation commission has the ability to conduct an independent
investigation, while a mediator only works with the parties to resolve the
dispute.
Because it would be so difficult to find a neutral mediator, it is also
unlikely that anyone would be able to fill this "enhanced mediation" role.
Although the conciliation process itself is distinguishable from mediation,
the problems regarding mediator neutrality are still present. If a neutral
mediator could be found, it might be wise for the parties to switch to a
conciliation scheme where they could engage in fact-finding to determine
what options could be most successful. Although mediation should be the
first choice for the parties to successfully resolve the dispute, conciliation is
certainly a viable alternative.
126 See YARN, supra note 111, at 106-07.
127 See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States (ICSID), Chap. III, art. 34. See also Lester Nurick & Stephen J.
Schnably, The First ICSID Conciliation: Tesoro Petroleum Corporation v. Trinidad and
Tobago, 1 ICSID REV. 340, 348 (1986) (referring to a statement by Lord Wilberforce that
a conciliator's main responsibility is to "examine the contentions raised by the parties, to
clarify the issues, and to endeavour to evaluate their respective merits and the likelihood
of their being accepted, or rejected, in Arbitration or Court proceedings, in the hope that
such evaluation may assist the parties in reaching an agreed settlement").
128 UNCLOS, supra note 46, at art. 284, para. 1-2. Despite the fact that this
provision exists, none of the parties involved in the Caspian dispute have signed
UNCLOS. Therefore, since UNCLOS does not technically apply to the dispute, it is
unlikely this provision will have any effect.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
VI. COMING EVENTS AND THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT
Boundary disputes are probably one of the "oldest causes of armed
conflict," but they are now more typically settled by negotiations, not
force. 129 As the field of international law has developed, states frequently use
the comprehensive rules available and apply them in negotiated settlements,
rather than resorting to armed conflict. 130 The Caspian region can be
extremely volatile because of hostilities existing in the area. The boundary
dispute over the Caspian has only increased the tension in the region.
The Caspian region is a hotbed of potential conflict. For example, in the
summer of 2001, reports of Iranian military planes entering Azerbaijan's
airspace were in newspapers across the globe. 131 Tensions between the two
countries reached a peak when an Iranian warship forced an Azeri research
vessel out of a disputed part of the Caspian.132 The deep-seated mistrust
existing in the region, especially between Azerbaijan and Iran, does not help
the parties negotiate to reach an agreement. Iran wants a larger share of the
Caspian than it would have under current proposals put forward by other
parties regarding sectoral division, and it is not likely to compromise. 133
129 O'CONNELL, supra note 40 (manuscript at 29).
130 Id.
131 Iranian Military Plane Enters Azerbayjan Airspace Again, AGENCE FR. PRESSE,
Aug. 1, 2001, available at 2001 WL 24982522. Television stations in Azerbaijan
reported that an Iranian air force reconnaissance plane entered Azeri airspace at least
twice in four days. Iran Denies Its Military Planes Have Entered Azeri Airspace, AGENCE
FR. PRESSE, Aug. 3, 2001, available at 2001 WL 24983580. Azerbaijan's President
Aliyev believes this to be a violation of international law because Iran is attempting to
use force to get its way in the Caspian region. Id. However, Iran denied claims by
Azerbaijan that Iranian military planes entered Azeri airspace. Id. This aspect of the
conflict is sharply contrasted with the fact that some Middle Eastern scholars believe the
reason for most conflict in the area is U.S. policy, as the United States views the Caspian
as its next source of energy. Professor Says Wise Diplomacy Needed on Caspian Issue,
supra note 82.
132 Iranian Military Plane Enters Azerbaijan Airspace Again, supra note 131. This
incident, although alarming, could have pushed the parties into a "new willingness to
finally solve the decade-old oil dispute." Putin Hosts "No-Ties" CIS Summit in Seaside
Resort, supra note 56.
133 Iranian Military Plane Enters Azerbaijan Airspace Again, supra note 131.
Interestingly, even if the other littoral states were to come to an agreement, it is unlikely
that Iran will be persuaded to alter its position on equal division because Iran is not in a
hurry to develop its Caspian resources-unlike the other littoral states whose economies
could use the boost that oil production could cause. Albrighton & Lowe, supra note 53
(explaining that Iran does well enough in its Persian Gulf oil fields to "'try to force the
others into a corner"') (quoting Richard Lee, a senior analyst at the Centre for Global
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Other states are optimistic that the dispute will not reach the point of
armed conflict, especially considering the fact that Iran is known to have a
relatively powerful military, and Russia has large remnants of the military
that participated in an arms race with the United States during the cold war.
However, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan have "no military
capabilities at all in the Caspian Sea" and most likely do not have any
intention of entering into a military conflict in the Caspian.' 34 Russia's
adamant stance that the parties should resolve their problems "exclusively by
political means at the negotiating table" should help prevent armed
conflict. 135 Of course, if Iran and Russia were to begin another arms race, it
is most likely that the former Soviet Republics would not be able to compete
on the same level; therefore, demilitarization of the Caspian region is the best
solution for all of the littoral states. 136 The parties will have to work
diligently with one another in order to promote the peaceful resolution of this
dispute; the best result will be achieved if the parties allow a neutral third
party to assist with negotiations so the dispute may be resolved faster.
VII. CONCLUSION
As the littoral states continue to make bilateral treaties with each other,
no quick resolution of the Caspian dispute is in sight. The parties need to find
a neutral third-party mediator or conciliator that will stop the countries from
forming bilateral alliances in attempts to maximize their present, temporary
gains. These bilateral treaties only drive the countries further apart, as shaky
and shifting alliances build mistrust among the parties.
It will probably be difficult for either the European Union or NATO to
intervene in this dispute because of the unique regional nature of the dispute.
Some of the countries involved in the dispute see the United States as behind
Energy Studies). Moreover, relations between Iran and Azerbaijan continue to be tense,
despite visits between leaders of the two countries. See, e.g., Sohrab Morovati,
Azerbaian President Arrives in Tehran on Sensitive Visit over Caspian Row, AGENCE FR.
PRESSE, May 18, 2002, available at 2002 WL 2409251 (noting tense discussions, as
President Khatami of Iran referenced the "Mazandaran Sea," the old Persian name for the
Caspian, causing quite a stir among the Azerbaijani delegation, who viewed Khatami's
use of the old Persian name as offensive).
134 Socor, supra note 79, at 7. Russia and Iran are both known to have a "significant
naval presence in the Caspian." Storm in a Precious Teacup, supra note 68.
135 Russia Urges Azerbayan, Iran to Show "Wisdom" and Restraint over Caspian,
WORLD NEWS CONNECTION (Washington, D.C.), Aug. 3, 2001, available at 2001 WL
26262004 (stating that direct dialogue between Azerbaijan and Iran could eliminate
tension and help them find a solution).
136 Socor, supra note 79, at 7.
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these organizations, and most are not in any hurry to develop U.S.
involvement in the area any further. As a result, it is difficult to imagine a
mediator that would be acceptable to all of the parties. However, it is even
more unlikely that the parties themselves will reach an understanding that is
agreeable to everyone. One of the biggest problems with the Caspian dispute
is Iran's staunch position regarding common ownership or equal division.
Iran's adamant refusal to accept any proposal other than a 20% equal
division has essentially stonewalled the negotiations. Unfortunately, Iran's
position on equal division has not softened over the course of negotiations. In
fact, it has appeared that Iran is determined to block any agreement that does
not include an equal share among all of the countries. Moreover, negotiations
are hampered by the fact that it seems like Russia is attempting to ensure
Russian pre-eminence in the region, possibly through a subregional
arrangement with the former Soviet republics. 137 These behaviors are very
harmful to the negotiation process, and it is likely that only a third-party
neutral will be able to bring the parties closer together. 138
Because the littoral states already have agreed on sectoral division, the
big question remaining is where the lines will actually be drawn. 139 It
appears that Azerbaijan and Iran have the positions that are the furthest from
resolution, and they must come to some kind of an understanding if
negotiations are to proceed. After a decade of stalled negotiations, the
Caspian negotiators must realize that a change is necessary for the dispute to
be resolved. The parties must consent to allow a third-party mediator or
conciliator who is not personally invested in the dispute to intervene because
that neutral party should be able to push the parties toward a resolution. If the
parties refuse to allow a third party assist with the dispute resolution
procedures, it is unlikely that the Caspian dispute will be resolved without
violence, and consequently, the Caspian's resources will remain untapped for
years to come.
13 7 Id.
138 As a last resort, if the parties involved were to take the dispute to the
International Court of Justice, it is probable that the court would use the equidistant lines,
and when considering proportionality, make adjustments using special circumstances.
Papadopoulous, supra note 30, at 15. See also Clagett, supra note 39. Special
circumstances could include equitable concerns, previous arrangements, and
proportionality.
139 Papadopoulous, supra note 30, at 25.
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